

Imports of intelligence needed analysis or when this kind of help was unique in positive intelligence operations.

At comint was understandably cautious in raising my alarm over the possibility of MRBMs in Cuba.

[Cunning did not ignore strong, direct evidence⁴ on missiles. Direct evidence was weak, in fact if it was appropriate.]

Problem was 3 prior poles, preconceptions
and some of them, of course built up, speed, scale,
processions not treated as

"indirect evidence."

[These things were as likely given SO intent
^{short} not to put in MRBMs as given intent to put in
missiles. Since, "that is evident" ^{after May 29,}

(Except to Malone & file final SO were supplied
- puzzling - i.e. unpredictable, unpredictable, unless
I do want to put in MRBMs.)]

?
A mistake: lack of direct evidence taken as over strong
evidence - but missile would not appear soon.

In 30 days ending ²² Aug., only 7 reports on "missiles" (shells).
Next 30 days, more than 40; at least 40 between 20 Sept.
and 14 Oct., including a few on large missiles.

In other period, 6 reports ending 5 Oct-28th, 4 on May 25th.

In mid-Sept., no evidence of Gov's intention and no
evidence that strat. missiles had already arrived.

15 Sept. Letter from source; plotted zone in Pinar del Rio
guarded by forces 20 ft of 7 ft; access to forces controlled;
believed concerned with missiles. Disseminated 18 ft.

Agent: contact pilot said on 7 ft: reports for RBMs.

Discord. 20 ft

Agent: chief of war plans: have stone weapons. 21 ft.

Refugee: convoy, 12 ft, ^{atmos} ^{intercepted}, drivers 85-90 ft 21 ft

Refugee: it left + convoy, fort broken on 2 ft 21 ft

" " ^{to be arrested} drivers, right of 7 ft, convoy 10 ft

Agent: interested at Pinar, 19 ft 17 ft + general 10 ft 20 ft

(comment: very likely that some concerned
about to

state " 10-2 months by unlocated")

Refugee: acting at mailed. 20 ft

More later, but these enough for strong suspicion.

April - Sept. over 1000 reports from CIA by clandestine sources

April - Oct. 5700 sites

8700 reports from refugees, CIA - Det.

Reports in third week of August indicated to country that
scale and magnitude of influx of CIA personnel +
equipment into a non-CIA country was unprecedented in
low-intensity civil activities.

These refugee reports were so obviously biased that all
were refugee reporting sources to be regarded with strong
suspicion. — Isolysts, using very approach they could to
affirm US to liberate Cuba from Castro.

[Question of bias → reports of "prosecutions" by
Cuba had low residential weight.]

[Though still, could influence non activities,
help form hypotheses; focus attention on
all these activities being very sensitive to info,
assigning little "weight." Accepting very
high false alarm rate. "Most, private."

Threshold for this slightly lower than for: 1) Isolysts, 2) Isolysts
3) Isolysts, Isolysts, 4) Pro, Det., 5) Isolysts of "entire"

7. Decisions on air strike; series reduced? Why put on Saturday? (to allow cover story?) Why bad in Meade?

8. Decision on ~~over~~ 21 air strike. Effect of "warning".

9. Effect of K letter.

10. What happened on air cover; decision, operation.

Meade? 50 threats? apparent success

of air attack on Saturday?

Questions on Bay of Pigs: Johnson

1. Was there a chance landing would take place before election?
2. Was there a participant in the full - as plans changed to a landing?
3. Why was small number considered adequate for landing?
4. Role in JFK's mind of his campaign pledges?
5. Fear of low reaction; of comparison to Hungary, Bay?
6. Who advised the incident could be worst, minimum?
7. Why did JFK rule out US intervention; a press conference if that? How much did this influence his later?
8. Plan for US help after gov. established on mainland? How big, how soon?
9. Role of Stevenson; did he know? Did he influence Pres? Was his earlier influence important?

1961
See for is statement by State Dept that ^{reports} auto would at
DO establish missile bases.

1955

Aug 23, 1955: you with Elba, Pres 1 suspension from
seafloor of tiny, for Langbank (Kenning). Do
nothing till can judge type of for. Min activity then decide
whether desirable proceed. [After 2000 ft]

Dec 1, 1955. Pres disposed to let Langbank proceed,
fully Elba exposed.

May 17, 1956: Operate postponed for this leg!
Marshall's movement under existing circumstances
[after Cagman - & wait?] [OK flights?] The weather along in the littoral is now then experienced!
Sept 1, 1956: UK advised information from Canton Island.

OK

5. Who/why/when decided not to 'get Castro' or even
arrest him, etc.?

6. Did Cuban forces, pushed, how many miles
would turn up in Cuba, then or later, and effect of
this?

7. Did we ever possibly think Cubans might gain control
into that, ever?
(Cuba, we strained the meaning of control. Why?)

and private interests placed no restriction on
type or purpose of weapons in Cuba.

If weapons were put under Cuban control,
this would reduce chance of US attack on Cuba; but
they won't.

Why do rockets in Cuba ~~reduce~~ ^{improve} Cuba's
defensive capability? more than missiles in SD?

Military equipment Cuba needs for its own defense
but of Germany's control. If US controls already in SD.

Q. "How could Cuba be a threat to US?"

Consider relative size + resources, of the two.

But what assurances were being given
of role of苏联 in Cuba? US could have
easily + quickly put more missiles in Cuba than
it had in SD + Patagonia + what then of
"little Cuba"?

Questions on Cuba:

1) What led to emphasizing danger of nuclear war (not emphasizing non-nuclear acts by US) - if the first round test of grad. 1 by discussion? Why, "full retaliatory response"?

2) Why did SC maintain hostile after Oct 22? Were they taken completely unprepared by US disclosure: no plans to respond? ... Can did they even know to announce after Nov 6? ... Why no use of these plans? (See statement by Rep. of UN - given on Oct 23). (See Nov. of Oct 73).

3. On retaliation: if US had no need to put retaliatory weapons in Cuba, given economy, etc. of missiles in SC, and if rockets in SC were available for retaliation, why did they put them in Cuba "for defensive purposes"? If all weapons in SC are "defensive" then can retaliation of hostile

Effects of secrecy: Effort to keep activities X. secret
in one's own country (in part, to keep opponent from
focusing on them) may keep one from focusing
attention on activities X. by opponent.

Iterations

17 May 2003

R's attempts to refurbish his positions on long-standing East-West issues will be formulated with an eye to preparing the ground for a new cycle of negotiations which Moscow anticipates following the US elections.

May 2003. The Cuban & US have made similar statements. No action will be taken on the US issues till after the US elections, suggesting the two are consulting closely on the problem.

Front got in coverage concern info on Soviet intentions
and Cuban expansion threat. No reporting sources in
the SC provided a specific link as to how intentions, and
no sources close to Cuban leadership provided anything
specific on their decisions and actions with the build-up

OCIO, FIR, DDIA, DASA, SOCIA

Intelligence working group

Supreme General: Dir, and Staff of FIR;
Chief, CIA-CIC; Co-Op Dst Dir for Intell. Planning;
Gen Off, Task Force W, G-4.

What if there had not been the intelligence build-up
in Cuba? What if kind of will, intention to
feel them out, was? Any second difference had
buildup notice?

Action started between Feb - March '62; 26 ordered
intensification March 14, '62, after reviewing preliminary findings
of US 80-62, 31st Analysis. Intensified increase
in collection by end of July.

May - CIA Intergovernmental funds disbursed, action on assets.

For lesson on recognition of quality from US, reminiscent
of illustration of inequality;
need to relate relationship; but unwilling to
compromise.

Basic purpose of class of options, broadening
options, testing accommodation (co-operation
that meets all basic requirements, "mutually"?)
- high level of aspiration \rightarrow willing to
compromise) imposed by the of G.W. and
optimization

Difficulties that both do not consider each
other as necessary to meet other, basically

NE 11-9-62 Tandem Bus foray Rly 2 May 62

for which, as a matter of general policy, the owners
utilize a limited ratio of using their own forces to
rental fleet given. Each in non-financial areas
(with occasional money to be loaned from owners.)

The challenge to national interests is not great enough
and their main involvement is not direct enough to
involve risk of a direct counter between U.S. and forces

1. The point which John had mentioned with the
out was that Norway or not that they could not be
in contradiction of U.N. as to regard with [REDACTED]

"National Liberation" means national
uniting Chinese nation that U.S. was only not
allowing the use of force

Reactions of any fundamental importance of policy in
the light of a somewhat sketchy record of events.

(Chairman present) will not, in view, cause the
Dues to own significantly greater action East-West
controversies than they are now willing to complete.

(Dues evidently informed by Castro's identification
of Cuba with the Bloc. USSR will mind ceasing
spirituality obligation to defend many of regime, e.g.
by acting underif necessary that Dues spread Cuban
propaganda, although self-ident. with the Bloc will
mean spread of Cuban new and will prompt for
expanding Cuban movement, + its influence in the countries.)

(Expected pressure on Berlin, but since nothing about
of USSR would say ff that, little compeling seen.)

see Bill Hyland from date 19.11.68 on Berlin

extracted in first draft of SANE

INQ objected, on basis of intelligence of DAB talks on
not rising from the election, the right of public statement can be taken.

3. Aug: (Bill Hyland?) - Do. Berlin - that was
on that the chances are better than ever that

9. now place little hope in further negotiations and
have decided to move forward militarily, exemplifying
pursued the various options of a peace treaty, and
to some point in this process, moving to

(Berlin back from 6th, late July; now in the already)

no NATO treaty is necessary; that of alliance treaty

is evident (Prudent), overall, abiding the requirements

there is Berlin, threat to East Germany

as is mentioned in ^{8/8} basis of this news

to 2. Sept.

"Agreement" on 3/14/ 11-15-62

W.W. (Dan) : Thinks: Int'l. Com. Note Draft. 7

(copy of Dan's Draft. Draft 6)

... at least
judgment ... function which can't be appointed by the
members.

believe, the policy is in a form of attached up

for some a movement to bring about administrative report.

... Drafts ... they have attached on top of this further information

... further believe that there are still not decisions

of policy ... place, trust until they have been able

to implement its basic function in advance or have

what they consider adequate reassurance from what (that
(acceptable)

such function can be implemented with no risks.

Draft. 8/15 11-15-62 10 Draft - after 8/18 meeting

"believe" it can put forward it

... when a proposal to take measure

addition of agency, department,

The right public law statement, Engels' MR

was "Reassuring": "elections" were first an armed
struggle for one man's government.

2. P.L.L.: Current Provisions in Berlin

1. Bonn, declared a "peace" in regard over Berlin.

It was this, by law necessarily ended at - a separate

treaty. The right for months and insisted the envisaged

an extended condition of negotiations. However, this

likely that it will continue to make various mutations?

now is able to accomplish planned + de facto now

the changes which would flow from a peace treaty

(Discretionary changes, about not all from the right!)

right statement of the right appears to make at a

separate treaty in the next few months. It is possible

that took advantage of the situation at the time, but also

connected with the issues of tension over, also for that

the laws to conclude one sign that a separate treaty

should have a direct challenge to the Western powers; and

wasn't Berlin is too dangerous a course.

(do some press statement now publicly today;
would conclude that it is unlikely, but make
concession to CIA now in measure we "let over the top";
the Dept. statement however does say it is concluded
and really conveys CIA is being a good cooling-off but
without strong dissension.

Why should we take the animal? Why not
different ways, not consumers?
NR people concluded to CIA that "to let the
basic animals" in the land, (from that) one
group of NR had one animal they didn't have; & the ^{ONE}
right not have the ability in private, now that
NR had. Neither had been fully known.

Why not realistic estimate after Sept 11?

Instead of any information (?) if they is a 10% cut
offers, to 11.11 clients.

Jan, 15 Ipt, I was signed agreement with
them that they would not station missiles on its
soil. — After 2nd month of refusing to sign this,
pushing for more extension, 1000 feet

Looked to them like further request: "We won't
station missiles near you, if you don't near us."

SN 16
Memorandum, 85-3-63 8:00 Advanced Weather Station in Cuba
August 10, 1962

Subject, The Military Building in Cuba, § 14.8.10.62

Purpos is to defend Cuba against the against what
the Cuban and Cuban consider to be a real danger that
in my attempt to annihilate (again). I have evidently

Changes from 14 Sept draft in 17 Sept draft

White: the US has granted more rights to other states, but not with such speed + flexibility; and it must wait until 10 July

Adol: the (1 Sept) statement as a whole is probably an substitute for the guarantee which the Central regime almost certainly has demanded.

[Signal - info - depends on perceived alternatives]

(One main way of preventing the US - or of allowing Central to prevent the US - by going too hard or too fast with an initial breakthrough)

Note: reiterates that 13th statement for first time
- Date: 30? -
- established link between 'Berlin + other cities' and
- agreed that 100 voters in Berlin would be counted by
- Date: 30?
- The names: Gauckler

(and labor)

13. The Jews themselves are probably still uncertain about

their future course in Africa. Indeed, they are enjoying
[future military program]

in a certain amount of expectation, and by watching

US + GA reactions as they go. [I probably intend to test

your reaction in my favor.] At the same time they

are obliged to take their policy to minimize certain of

expectations with the US

While it is an indictment that, even in the light of

worst development, the policy remains fundamentally

unchanged, one cannot exclude the possibility that

nowhere is at least considering a change in the policy

Consequently they seem to redesign their tactic to provide within
other types of operations to allow world power a ~~to~~
~~to~~ extract strong and element challenges to the US

(Chargé done a challenge to which the US might
possibly respond.)

On the whole we believe the USSR would not calculate
that if the IL-28 could be exploited to allow in
more than very small numbers without serious risk
of US counteraction.

(Chargé etc. ... now might calculate that a modest
number of IL-28s could be exploited to allow without
serious risk of US counteraction.)

(Chargé deliberately wait of US reaction as stated from
last of conference in it.)

The establishment of Cuban soil of our study forces

which could be used against the US would be

incompatible with low public ^{presently} ~~as we currently estimate it~~ X

It would indicate a low option willingness to risk

more than the US has indicated before, ...

1/2

~ While the US might feel that the additional effort of

defeating the US by stationing our own striking forces in the

surrounding position would be worth a good deal

Provided they could get away with it, they would

almost certainly not estimate that this would be worth

without launching a dangerous US reaction X

If the military advantage of a low attempt to use
also as a strategic strike were so marginal
or dubious and the risks went

[change to: Although there are some military
advantages in ... the risks would be great ...]

The political implication was certainly adverse
(they would run counter to the kind of policy the
Powers are actually pursuing in C.A.)

dict. The retention of low military forces at the
frontiers cannot be a hindrance to that power.

[Postscript to Letter not addressed; mention German
concerns, etc. over that Britain was being allowed
to remain with the war because of "other" reasons
at least till after election. No thought to actual forces
postwar to implement a low military effort
after election - which I was told not that would be
favoured by risks of conflict with US]

blities for an IA reaction to proceed inside here:

It is unlikely that the OIC as a whole could be

brought together on a single site of unit action. It is

almost certain that the OIC would be split between

stations occupying a minimally separated position & these affinity

of interaction

is left for the most Conclusion:

(Min. base) would be incompatible with gas reaction

to late and into the future as we presently estimate it.

Point: 1) Possibly K thought that by 21st 13 UK
already knew at least of preparations for NODS,
maybe 20-25, and decided to ignore.

2) JFK on morning of 22 Oct (like Johnson, RFK): If
we even in this one, clear for great breakthrough
to advanced negotiations.

3) High-staking mostly R on evening of 26 Oct;
arrange that we never get the out of its without
consensus on Turkey; reservation to deal on 27 Oct,
if we have to...

Roger at 22nd — but why? For stalling 26 Oct
still?
R Johnson? For managing 26 Oct, for Turkey? In
making it necessary for us to negotiate, harder to accept —
instead of being in free to offer, if necessary?

4. Private school - averages personal investment,
"a statement," fully by personal committee in
finances, collections

[Today I promised the gov - as "K, he"

"he couldn't make," "we will do that to him"]

Thompson nationally involved with K

5 & then to broader committee in anthropological, cultural
talk - from the gov to lead him to full self-disp.
letter, but he has refused kindly (very short refusals?)
several kindly, cultural interests printed. Some
including many references to Africa (to Malibut, among
other material; from H. Brant, "Kenya divided,"
from the Govt, "Kenya still not case open.")

second stage

6. Mission - beginning, statement really wanted in talk with
"Do you want to name your own - photo?"
H. in Mission. (What I always wanted - Christianity, salt
very little show up well in talk (1st. first day?)
Mission wanted the second will be released on 10/10 conference
Fulbright funded. (Molly? (Kenya?)

Personal Democracy

1. Did it affect, legal basis in relation with SEC because
of rules? 2) credit? expand? mitigate
expenses?

2. What was your own draft for his letters from
K?

3. What and content was there in friends email? How
different from public? (from: It's a letter meant
for executive publication).

Does this Executive conference, Dec 10, 2007 Did

he expose himself; controversy, challenging others, repeat
same doctrine; what past mistakes, basis for criticism,
basis for decision; without problem?

Did he say respond to SEC's question in letter?

Did tone ever change from friend?

What did he say to say "I am going to teach you?"

Miracle, Kop & Cba

1. Two different (still "philosophical" according to:

a) 1957-61 OSCE (IIG): 50 factors, different, initially,

type of - variation toward the principal elements

centralized; still having structure? (to what degree?)

(Central - Bluff, wouldn't like confrontation even.

Perha if he didn't have the cards, wouldn't gamble

on elements' reality; wouldn't only on effect of

female on Illinois.

b) C.C./State: 50 factors, way of direct confrontation,

Doesn't still mean anything. Merely the value of

units of evidence. What to be used by Police and

wanted statement

✓ =

10 Aug. 1968	8 Aug. 1968. Briefing to R&B Policy Comm 10 Aug. 1968. Moscow meeting (MRRBM)
8 Aug. DCI: Second arrival of USSR representatives of foreign intelligence agencies of USSR + intelligence, and US cont. feels the possibility that of USSR intelligence agencies in India as a step it could justify removal of US missile bases in India + Turkey	10 Aug. 1968. USSR representatives of foreign intelligence agencies of USSR + intelligence, and US cont. feels the possibility that of USSR intelligence agencies in India as a step it could justify removal of US missile bases in India + Turkey
PRIOR TO MOVE OF USSR	10 Aug. 1968. USSR representatives of foreign intelligence agencies of USSR + intelligence, and US cont. feels the possibility that of USSR intelligence agencies in India as a step it could justify removal of US missile bases in India + Turkey
10 Aug. 1968 [Brief SU knew what dictated to USSR attitude of USSR] 4. 1. 3-ft? w.r.t. USSR?] (28.8-ft R-2F)	10 Aug. 1968. USSR representatives of foreign intelligence agencies of USSR + intelligence, and US cont. feels the possibility that of USSR intelligence agencies in India as a step it could justify removal of US missile bases in India + Turkey
10 Aug. 1968 DCI 21 Aug. 1968. <u>missed</u> time 10 Aug. 1968. USSR representatives of foreign intelligence agencies of USSR + intelligence, and US cont. feels the possibility that of USSR intelligence agencies in India as a step it could justify removal of US missile bases in India + Turkey	10 Aug. 1968. USSR representatives of foreign intelligence agencies of USSR + intelligence, and US cont. feels the possibility that of USSR intelligence agencies in India as a step it could justify removal of US missile bases in India + Turkey

✓

18 Aug: Chittick called by SAPP.

28 Aug: anti-: agreed with 2nd plan for US actions

agreed: USAG 181.

action of US (2)

of USAG

2) first est. + same 35M (Heavy Cover, 27 Aug)

now by USG (2-2) + DFT. of 31 Aug;

initial result (?) of 27 Aug minor.

19 Aug: USG started another 35M to move to SAPP, 26 Aug

27 Aug: US began Cuban flightline to Pao, a 5G (Aug).

Tell 19 Sept.

EN Aug 29 Aug: to USA, Wilson asked SAPP on

mis. buildup.

7 Sept: ^{other} attempt to start it down, 1 T29 etc.

from 29 Aug, 5-9 etc will be abandoned.

✓

29 Aug USIS entry: Carter, in 1 that a

27 Aug, 1963, planned from ~~out~~ of town; constant rain

avg. daily of 20 Aug caused by weather, had to

not leave boat ~~was~~ getting new boat plates.

| Oct. left Mach 23 Aug to West Coast, left US

on 30 Aug for Panama, returned 23 Oct

SG 30 Aug. (total of 20 Aug plus?)

Pass total = 820000, \$1 Aug.

On 4+5 Oct, Carter brought boat for P. B. and two

On about 6 Oct [her name; restriction to Sun, 7 Oct]

On more detailed visit of 27 Aug flight had 240000

to import \$1 million boat of minusc. size - ~~possibly~~
Cuba

1989 - at Curaçao Carter informed P. B. McVay

left, no equivalent had been imported to US.

(new - total info)

✓

10 a.m. 2nd activity needed to end down range.

2 p.m. come, & request of 2, several vehicles available
for use of down.

10 p.m. Center to Mall,

14 p.m. 108 found 86 on site for use. End use of down,
No verbal communication functional till use of both
U-2 messages, available.

14 p.m. CIA study working down its own S-2 control lines.

18 p.m. item in 108

[13 p.m. 082 estimate? / Did P-2 know of action of down
before using statement?]

inc.

(Aug?)

10 p.m. 2nd time: R, OTR, 108, Center, handle

890

41 On 30 2nd, 10-2 over updating, substituted in 9.11.1,

by 108. 6/8/87 end of first flight, down range

Waves, reluctance to use in operation? 890

✓

① No recent major wave forecast (246 avg).

Wind intell. - Westerly - not good as to predict

a wave of alarm is a safety that might never repeat.

State of sea and other alarm devices system

(wave, wind etc.) had been forecast in NTS of Aug 1

and this first wind full reported. Since, nothing

came out as a start, but as a problem to be dealt
with ultimately (May we have enough to allow more

of energy of 23 avg, know allowing than otherwise)

[Crash f. 23 avg - 52 ft over]

Planned to provide systematic coverage of part of Alcatraz

for full story. To include and for re-coverage of

area of 2 previous mission.

② Finally, stratosphere: considering imminent invasion;

law form on Earth, ultra elevation

[600 ft; 1000 ft, 1000 ft] [2000 ft]

Clouds and not damage. Column as ceiling issue.

[Plane, form of incident]



R dictated to Tug (7) standard overflight of CH.

covering remainder of island.

184 for minimum safety.

(No written record of distance not to exceed known 36 mi,

but in obtaining approval for tracks & it was necessary (?)
to include distance by digit).

Plan standard (antennae) 3 left flights in addition to

one morning of normal flight greater - 10 hrs

One additional morning 3 flights

SNIE 80-2-2. Re distance, engine disengagement in shelter

flight - engine of nose usually fails first, easily

in nose. (?)

Set fuel to give endurance enough to force of 10 hrs

and to just back of morning by last flight

Flight will be influenced by distance - protection

and insulation. May need to land at 10:30

and fly out on 10:30 (no effect
with 10 hrs. That would be a minimum)

~~6. T. II seems that in the of slow-paced languages~~

for use, long, thin, dark color, pattern with
markedly
already different.

Also, balance program looks better in long.
when the program is supplied sequentially by balancer,
taking it as per command, it takes hearing changed
to accurate timing & prints raw memory (C inter-
val) manually by keys - incidentally under memory test.
command) even though fullfilled you not interested;
risk of error in Autol.

Re-wire. CMS initiated later cleaning; not critical

as request of against continental mailights; we did it
that day.

DCI

794t: "Left, call to Carter during frequent report room;

" my hand is in right hand, ^{report of} 80 short-range

2000 ft target, type [Scud, 327] with initial command

important target & SF 08 + low. Carries"

1) Did he indicate 327 is possible, possible?

1024t: "Difficult for me to reasonably determine initially

(13, 16, 20) defenses being established when we appear to

know one (SE? Pao). we quite possibly necessary question

as for portion of prevailing theory of some

defenses established much as Pao's to be

indicated by his other recent share contributed

and create demand

from

to our flights. I suggest

DNT: Only action...

1104t: Do not wish to be ^{prematurely} claiming this matter

but believe, OSA, you want, by now informed

of danger of a surprise and also that intention of

pref. If for possible threat, our capabilities [SIGHTING]



one Cuban defense system position.

[One, etc. in effect comes all products on basis
of US capability; I based on US will, which
in C + K does more short than estimation.]

200 ft: reposition on NIE: "as an alternative to consider

that an offensive by USSR in Cuba will provide

base with most important offensive launching position

in connection with all other critical areas and bases

they might take unrelated with to establish next
position."

As a result of DC's pressure, extremely maintenance

of other methods of measurement (DC had called on 27 Aug;

called on 7 Dec, but had asked that base on 7 Dec 10

Note: the discussion was in terms of what might

be necessary after the establishment of a complete

SA-2 defense system made up of U-2 operations, with the



SNIS. What was the result?

"What are they (Ku Klux Klan) after the election?

And the position be better than? (Not much.)

What are causes for helping them? (Pro?)

Just to be nice? So get other known?

Effect of Duke-Poor, etc: to reduce incidents

too much incidents; and to add to cost of

incidents? (Also the feeling that incidents might

there would be an association with incidents + US

response there would be trouble, in back?.

What was our plan in case of shooting?

What was our expectation of SIS response?

What is what is left? - Aug 19, Right back home

set down?

What would we have done? Expected?

What would SIS have done? Allies?

Final action - forward of NAFM?

Elections

Do views really influence? When does
conflict break? (Bush vs. Clinton? Iraq?)
(Did Iraq really serve Saddam, or provide an excuse
for intervention, invasion?) (Osama? Korea? Cuba?)

Or is it perceived as appearing to risk conflict,
making coalition members more committed, preferring
unity rather than invading it? e.g. the following
Bush statements; U.S. insisted on control in Iraq.

Did altitude of Pres + S.G. toward U.S. incident
differ from in 1995-1996? In which case did
things change? Did the Pres. break off the
negotiations? e.g. water, agriculture (1996?)

important thought that only at the last would the
Soviet not the introduction of such weapon in MRBM

[Then: a) N.C. thought MRBM would not come till

very later; did not think they were already in. ?

What N.C. informed to them they were already in?

What other especially important at the conclusion?

c) Other was nothing to us, other more than U-2 if necessary.

i) Question if U-2 had been shot down, a big attack?

(Night, no, four aircraft explosion, need for surveillance;

second 801 either to be more efficiency or more more?

What then?)

e) Mean life, was other - 85 remained in shot down

in 80 accuracy went between?

f) Did N.C. think now, that U-2 program was adequate

for light? Did he place for coverage before 10 Oct?

108-28954

18 Sept, 1981: Carter stated during to me, QF-1010
was the; B-52s also could be prioritized to SG

(On 18 Sept, Carter move to 2nd Inf: indicated "newly
arrived" SG approach to provide for replacement
and directed to him a tactic of tactical-type maneuver
against anti-SG forces.

19 Sept, 1981: Inf put SG in low-level esp. against
CIA, but 2nd Inf (aboard)

Carter said: "we cannot put a stop to collection in
Asia; otherwise the CIA would never have taken
the point of decision into warhead."

? (Notion raised in 18 Sept from esp)
consideration of use of
SG approach. Finally it must mention is

27 Sept, 1981: CIA forwarded to US? began for its use.

Authorization (29 Sept-2 Oct) pursuant to make public
but secret, source.

17.2.11: Chestnut - out of the Wohnung 4-22

27.3.11: Correspondent's cabin to Haven

10.8.11: The University Center (Our apartment)

17.8.11: Above Board Room + Mr. Office.

3 Oct: The
} 100' high.

9 Oct: Cannon

First layer equipped for the finished rock on Post, t

Marl 7-8 ft. Below 10-ft. Dist. between fault +

site by 17 ft. probably due to ploughing down
detected.

Major construction at Moravitz rock by 15 ft.

Marl: several materials - parts of low walls, from
1000 to 10000, below Aug 30 (before my arrival)

2100 ft. apart no marks to indicate activity before

1 for 62. Gp. Beta catch 11-26-62

On May 12, NADC started wire, Date Evaluation of
Info on Cuba. Between 21 May - 5 Jun (7 days)

NADC examined 135 raw reports received that for comments;
only 3 stood merits out. That could be related to SEMA
censorship; NADC rejected those 3.

14 May. CI informed orally of NADC's offer [from NDC?] not
to publish any info sent on missile bases till it had
been checked out with NDC. (matter of intell.
Technique, not policy)

[Anticipated as banning publication without comment?]

CI rebuked NADC (10 May and 31 May) 25 reports of info,
4 more by phone; in all cases NADC either checked the
accuracy or made a written filing.

[Did this stop publishing?]

In Sept, 882 reports on internal situation were
received (only 100 or 120 publishable, greater of no + internal).

Knowledge of analysts that deployment of SAMs
was going on (after 24 Aug - 5 Sept) plus difficulty in
internal clearance in till 11 hours from after results,
scrambled MIGM deployment.

[e.g. would make it harder for operator to
justify the new policy of committing;
or to communicate the combined weight of a effort.]

[Had operator/analysts been caught in false
alarm during the process?]

Information: In restricted area was targeted for over, not
as another location where illegal mining activity ~~was~~
to be should be targeted by platform 3 was this a
category? [but is a major SS-2 site] Proven tool.

→ went for information to target and → 26 on 23 Sept;
began on 21 Sept, 26/17 Sept, around 27 Sept; located
the same location. (and on 23 Oct. (comes targeting
hitting tanks, largely C4)

Priory requirements should now [standby] for
loss before inside construction, particular attention to SS-4

System I standy?

Plans 27 right, right lane written item for CIB, report
for inspection. 13 9 ft.

13 9 ft. 0.5 m. (only stand by 3 ft.)

(Meanwhile, other "standby" construction - right lane left
construction ongoing. (But, why in CA?)

Restrictions liable apply to Chestnut, but neither of this
(why?) does for Cuban after largely on the Cuban

Due to money to which been not apply; the cut off
as you are an off-duty officer (Chestnut report)

[Cut off Pass?]

by other officer of now retained on Cuban)

With Chestnut, you, or any other CIB officers
know that possess of your base had been carried by DCI
and severely discussed with Parasite and to continue

(NSC 181 didn't allow down, except a form of SNS).

Would items have been published without down?

Analysts were writing to the ^{too} historical political

input of the reports they were writing; the world
not have influenced them against publication, but would
have made them want to be doubly sure; esp. in a slight
with nothing back to our man in Moscow.

Also, rigid compartmentation between COMINT - 86

org. responsible for collection and the still analysts.

For if my COMINT analysts on River problem can talk about
changes. Here, they did not know that no

meetings of River at Dic and Los Villas were included

in last telegram or that other person was already informed.

They had no way of knowing that the flat, unpublished the

and unpublished documents from the forthcoming, etc. might

well have delayed publication from today to day in life of message.

What now, items would have appeared in Cuban Daily
Morning, does night have some in Centrists (prob.
not same personnel now), Answers for (18) ; is Pro
night now closed, there was sufficient activity now
in Centrist about 2 weeks before he apparently did.
Is even targeted, but now not published

Prob. that SG first heard of this concern on

9 Oct.

Up to 7-10 days later, analytic correlation of info and
SG activity, due to embarrassment presence of admin structure (?)
authenticating SG ; Marshall design to provide
adequate justification and method later work before
real decision was made, maximum delay to only days
of U-2 ops. Tested for control of U-2 ops strategic
use of U-2, not for test of initial situation. After
10 Oct they were gathered.

[But, now?]

8 ft program took 26 days from 12 ft (constant
on about 10 ft vision and then been increased)

Started 7 Oct. (Cloud cover vision on 17 ft)

26 ft seen 8 times, 29th take off - by 8 P.M.;
8 ft finished; 7 Oct finished).

On 10 days with 8 ft. we were not at maximum
($< 15\%$ cloud cover).

Effect of 8G vision of 10 ft ~~as~~ weather went
very ^{bad} consideration (2) of what vision should go next
still only 8 ft.

Randy + Hansen, who told Picard 10/16/00/01

By late Sept., losses seem (?) + loss of wisdom
of continual low build-up, had greatest greatly
increased scope of inquiry in West. [who?]

But high-level consideration of MRAMs always in
time of low return after SA-2's fly position.

To do. wisdom of return toward re-flight of SA-2
defended even till 26 (Aug) auto of 4 Oct.

DCI: 0-2 flight was now (before last 2. 1st fly) restricted
by presence of SEMs to 50 gradient of 200: questioned
whether this was a reasonable restriction at the time,
particularly since SEMs were almost certainly not present.

Did this agree on restriction?

SA-2 advised NRO (Plant?) to plan recall program
for return of SA-2 for auto of 9 Oct.

6 Oct: COMINR made to NRO 1st tell first 2 Regiments.

UIC committed this on 6 Oct.

Randy & Hansen, to total final for that agency

9 Oct. SG: 130's first recommendation: O-2 faded well.

except NRM as soon as weather permits.

Flight also to pass over area of SGM sites

target not ready operational sites.

Second day (?) return to SGM sites

to compare with a fully complete O-2 coverage as

best as possible.

Now if necessary SGM
if there is no ~~no~~ weather

to the initial O-2 route, maximum coverage of

western end of island by multiple O-2 simultaneously

as soon as weather permits. (Efficient?)

SG recommended return of 1st, Pass advised

Second day (?) running of some additional flights at the

time. Return delayed until till 19 & 20.

Footnote: accident that site was not in web.

would have been picked up yesterday.]

Bundy & Hansen, to Total Break & Test areas

After this minor skirmish, CR received on 10 Oct.

Play sheet of 28 Oct & 11-28 notes (see by 0-2 on

17 Oct, along with others) in addition of 11 Oct.

(after 0-2 notes)

10 Oct: DCI brief of CR Submitter of these Abbr. in

Build. identity IL-28s. Comment on NARM on

discrepancy, adding that there were no info to

ab. did not believe the two would make contact

now, but he differed with them; told DCI

had a flight for next day - on

11 Oct. Carter to Hartnell; 10-11 Oct. Hart [10 Oct]

and, refugee who has no land evidence.

11 Oct: Carter to Hartnell - these Discrepancies (below, points available).

15 Oct: Dr. NMC told DCI, early morning; ^{possible} 2015 - Carter.

Carter said and till Taylor & Carroll, NMC if he was present.

[EG time?] As info became known, DCI advised not to

wait till morning to tell NMC - State; about 2200 he passed to

Brody & Gilman, who told Hart, Hartman, Carter - DCI advised NMC.

until actual deployment.

Nothing on law states preparation for deployment to war base.

4 July Checklist: Paul 2nd trip, nothing more law

and. and I. especially more advanced equipments

and on M-16 and SAR which SC already

provided to submarine, flight testing.

13 July: C. Paul had left Moscow without travel liberty

or commissar, "a pretty good sign that visitors
unwelcome."

1 Aug 67: NIE 55-2-12 Pt. 14. Preparation taken on initial

foundation for Moscow.

2. By force of circumstances USSR is becoming even more
self committed to further strengthen the Castro regime.

USSR, however, has avoided in front commitment to protect

and defend the regime in all circumstances

3) in we also believe it unlikely that Blue will station

in Cuba. Also, contact wants of my description, at least for
period of the cat.

c. The USSR would eventually over intend
to lay such base capable for nuclear attack,

but USSR might to restrict the expansion that USSR
can with the protection of the missile power

d. We believe that USSR will continue to restrict its
military assistance to Cuba [to defensive purposes]
and policy which not favorable the expansion of
new advanced jet fighters, SAM, nuclear warheads, or
new satellite medium of ICBMs

I. Probabilistic meaning of "eventually"
believe
and not predict

1 Aug 2003: returned paper + first issue of not all

also probably on carrying military cargo to Abu

(as. NSA count on own info. it contradicted report

of Capitol Cable to Abu 11. + Paul had submitted to

take boat across over mountain.)

(DIA thought increased shipping due to Trade, tell 22 Aug?)

4 Aug: Clinton - support arms, "Abu

7 Aug: unconfirmed slightly mixed with July

8 Aug: DIA Capitol Public Policy

Conc, referring mainly to

Inv military equipment transmission.

10 Aug: Mazzoni - to DIA -

12 Aug: CIA pub 3AM

3 Aug, 25 Aug

10 fly: Taylor, because of continuous use of noon in
filling Chinese and set in English, about 301
for comp. names of noon

16 fly: DOT recommended to NCI that U-2 flights over
Asia be continued to the extent possible and

in particular, certain areas and periods
"combine evidence that morning reports of rebels
is reliable. Based on this belief," and
"are most important and is for evidence of
delays of SS-2 months and for M-2 in Asia."

Approved by DC on 19 May, the Pres.

21 May 1961, R, McN, J, ACP Ig, Sec, MC6

122 NCI 181 analysis of photo art. photo based
reports of rebels. Based on the SS-2 and M-2 info
available

21 Aug: DCI total grub up available time, 10 Aug

estimated start of new winter this morning

Hawthorn, first inst. 1949s; raised last of

1949s.

Surprise

Recipe for Total Empire Disaster Warning —

Implications After the Events

2d Points

- A. Strong belief that danger, if any, will not come before a certain date; all evidence remaining consistent with this
- B. Strong incentives not to prepare for it, plan, or prevent sooner than necessary (i.e. before a certain date, say, 6 months — or until prevention — ~~Prevention~~ — or unless necessary) to avoid forming public opinion, thereby reputation (or, ~~introduction~~, ~~introduction~~)
- C. Limitations on ~~new~~, ~~passive~~ posture, to avoid preventing danger sooner, or at all, or to provide grounds for ~~easy~~ to claim ~~prevention~~
- D. Restrictions on dissemination of info — relating to future threat — subject to interpretation as indicating ~~current~~ threat (in which you don't believe, and don't want to act against). ^{Paul Nitro} ~~Paul Nitro~~ ^{call}
 Paul Nitro: But ~~Belief~~ that threat is to different place; ~~strong~~ wish ~~not~~ to prepare for ~~possibility~~ that threat will be (when it comes).

(much)
Thus, silence is thoroughly consistent with
Options A and B. (Attack now or attack later;
attack later, no attack; attack here, attack there;
attack this way, or that.)

I believe strongly because of precaution, special, private
silence, that B is much more likely than A. In fact,
A is highly unlikely. But I do not wish to reveal that
there is new evidence supporting A:

1) I do not wish to reveal source of info.

or 2) I can't reveal crucial part of evidence supporting A
part of allies

or 3) public has different precautions, prior beliefs;
new evidence would lead them to domestic action.

4) Part of public or allies would interpret evidence differently...

5) " " " " " have different goals-values; if

their attention was focused on A as possible, would domestic action.

6) There are costs, constraints, risks that can't be revealed to

public, or public would evaluate differently, or public is ignorant of.
Possibility of action, effectiveness, less than public knows or can be told.

7) In particular, newly emerged expectation of A to bring on

allies might trigger uncontrollable reaction.

or the plans, etc. in "too certly" for the new friends revealing to them.
5.7.1




Moreover: (i) if it (B) needs to prepare for A's attack, though perhaps (wait for communism aspect) discreet (e.g. if it could be done secretly: no tanks, no signs, to public, allies, etc.)

(ii) if can prepare for B, expels without preparing for A, or even while unpreparing for A (increasing vulnerability, rising costs of A res should occur, neglecting A, indicating A will not occur, threatening immediately costly res if A should occur, ^{cuba} "doing nothing to deter".

[Cba: desire to reserve options that didn't agree on assumptions of A, would act if A, while implying that no immediate prob of A: Indictment + Treaty, "warning" (public warnings ignored by SO. — Eng.)] defines

B OR: (i) ²⁾ that + can prepare preparing for B without wait; (ii) right about it will not attack for B, it will costs. (Even,



4/11

General: I refrain from preparing for A at all if I even
suspect that A will occur. I even refrain from preparing for B.

Then A occurs. So, B occurs, and assumption
iii (a) + iii (b)
i) + ii) above turn out wrong.

Trouble explaining why no preparation, especially about
no expectation of A, when there was value pointing to A.
C.f. when Principle A is wrong, or unsurvivable, or
costly for it can't be remedied;
and/or Principle B can't be explained.

So, total failure to prepare for A seems
inevitable; either negligent, or deliberately malicious.
(i.e. not to prepare for something that is expected, and is
expected to be costly for nation : for individual or national gain).

(Truth: it ^{was} regarded as low prob, but didn't
try to prepare for it at all, or to focus public attention on it,
or to suspect belief by public, or this that it has only
the moderately low prob that seems valid.)



Meanwhile, there is every description of public
or other that there is any evidence supporting A
(admin. regards it as invis., or less strong than it will
be to others, or untrustable by the public,
^(admin. holds)
or a "story for A vs. C, but really generated by and
uniting to B.")
into a dissemination. like.

Special case:

You half-expect B, but you want it to come as an
opinion to others, public, Congress, etc. — as
opponent opinion to you.

For arranging this response, A occurs as a real
misleader, not that itself.
and finds you totally unprepared, for
never had to explain — connected with efforts to ensure that
B will come, if at all, as opinion.

[B might be our action: a derived fruit accomplish.]

To achieve fruit principle 1) encourage above state of mind
2) don't encourage inter-dependencies, predictions; 3. don't count on
opponents ability to keep secret of A want.



Reasons why negative emotions regarded as strong
and positive as weak

2) 1) Plaintiff now had two separate, set off for
IREM (there were demands on the 1) but
for SS-4 (that 1400 expect SS-4 in 'field code'-
- SS-1-3?)

2) Does confidence in S1?

3) any use of private funds; 1st substrate to expand
of housing; esp. given 1st section, the working, public entities
4) S0 failure to use 1st to 1st, and/or evidence?

1) 5) S0 short term leases off?

6) inconsistency of false reports; if events were of false reports,

7) Published news of refugees to cooperate 1st section, that

8) Unlawful measures; question of illegality

9) Plaintiff demand of S0; to forward demands
[Unlawful? Plaintiff's expectation of S0's 1st section]

10) Plaintiff's requirement by 1st section didn't know no coverage to

11) Did analysts know of 1st section?

6) 7) were to heavily restrict; + 11.6

3 (7) (Chairman): Analysts didn't know the clear program
wanted to dictate
didn't know (he) not being around ultimately thought this was

Admin was putting strongly into that A - M&BM's
before Victor - wouldn't know; was not specifying
degree of concern (e.g. 30, Victor, Roger, Patricia, Victor
in that B - in the Victor in after still
presented (into specif + obj of program, for personnel
advantages

just like July.

1) What were we trying to define B?

2) In retrospect, would it have been enough? Or would our

expectation of finding more time been understanding (SAC's)?

3) What would we have done if 50 had 1 round

After this to stop over 100m

2) quickly but without friction would suffice?

This brings in: What is a second good topic?

↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ + ↓ - ↓ - ↓ ↓

Pearl Harbor - long⁽⁰⁵⁾ - Cuba "lynchings" -

No insurance against threat is because so as not
to encourage concern over threat & what threat
needs insurance now

(High cost of threat & - if don't tell threat - with money
and that insurance against threat - real threat - can be
brought, later, into consideration to buy any war -)

This was the Miranda trap Pattern

Was a Pearl Harbor possible - if so had acted it?

Now relevant: was a CUBA Possible?

(If only 100% had been violent, inter. wouldn't look
bad from point of view of will + action
now program adequate relative to local - national -
plan & info from government they received. Not adequate

In 1970, MOSM - between stage + to the ABK area
had to make more info available

Sunday: 10am 12 kts. 11 tent w/H

10am 11. 8y + 2.

5:45 9tent 11th + 3

6:30 Pullen + 1st.

UT with Octo.

Initial Planning:

Preparation plan, running (to like, like),

• consultation in relation to a known contingency

is functional - foreign

(e.g. foreign to initial situation, threat A:

multiple moves (1992, 1993), and 1st threat for threat B,

etc. (WMD, Pox, nuclear, etc.)

For foreign go back to the State, Philippines;

e.g. the dissemination, control for staff work,

consultation may be functional, for security

Then, it is not only "what" that may be functional
• foreign (in form of back to the State, situation later)

• high level decision, but also "what" cannot
be done (functional, information, etc.)

REPORTS: ONGOING, SECRET

internal action may be functional or foreign

planning, preparation, deal, mitigation, analysis

in State

(at high level)

PROBLEMS: PREDICT, ANALYZE, MITIGATE; TREAT

Th., Oct 25

Environ. 10 5.

Prudsy & O'Toole and 2:19 Rushcut

2:26 Other small message without direct subject.

S.C. The College Env.

11:50 State dinner the President and First Lady

at 8 a.m. May intercepts Laramie

Feb. 20th 1923 10 a.m.

7:50 am Manila bound.

6 cm. latter being 8

letter from L to O that staying away from you
is final measure. 30.

Set, 27 Oct. 1960. 4000 ft. 10 mm. *R. altissima*. Pala Museum, Tigray.

Return 10:5-11a, 30-2 later, 11a-11b, 30-2

over 50. 9:35: will present to "ministers & ^{part} collecting" frequently, now to + stop 3:35: money 6-2-2011
etc at 4pm. 2000 for me. ^{officers} money to be transmitted

Oct 23 8:30am 10-6 ^{Leave home} Premium Park of Austin

8:30am arrival 10-6 am

Breakfast 6:57 am

7am Depart to OAS Region of Austin

7am OAS conference

4:45 19-minutes with Austin Parks Trunk Division

Meeting minutes showed.

4pm Start to S.C.

rest

Oct 24 8:30am 10:30am take off

9. S.C.

2:00 Start management and t.

3:24pm Start to S.C.

3:59pm Breakfast, then council of the park
(Austin)

(10am to 11:30am)

[Power force can be used to

a) achieve national objectives internal, external

b) meet internal targets

c) exert personal political targets, pub.

d) achieve personal, want to : Prin, Democracy, Equality

Am. thorough to use national power for

(a) or (b) Cato J could lead opportunity to
��度 States leader would be willing to use it for

(c) or (d) — we thought "justified" for (a), "unjustified"
for (C) — (d).

law power, + NAFTA — the case arises

P, H, F in US, and create political legends for

Prin & Admin. : Prin has no "rights" to interfere

freely, or even to object, yet if he excepts this,

it will not only interfere in his protégé, & others, and

feel bad; but with others & himself will believe

he will never use power (bad, without

unjustified) international will control). But if Prin

52 Oct.

52 - August 11

Striding Water

ABM. Division



ABM. 19 Dec

ABM. Division

ABM.

No?

Under ABM, 86 batt of 11 counts for, when handled
under ABM, was formed (?) system a consisted of
Undermining of 86, (Climbing), a, Hitting, Digging, Dug,

DC, Cover; the last (hitting Bay, in representation of
W.H.). In Under ABM, Plastic (Klimmer). Undermining,

and special staff under the last. Other walls
comes from C.R. In "stalled"; but, battle ended,
when final victory. W.H. had staff working on
already, not on fire.

Boulder, 86 were prepared in the Bay of Pigs.

Under ABM, McGraw Clam.

After Bay of Pigs, 86 gets battle, but under W.H.,
battle end at 1000 to 55 and minutes.

8.18 fight went going toward to follow on.

Taylor started for a while, then H.C.

In 86 last battle, when counts, when 860 (Digging
for counts), battle, ^{staff for ABM} (L. 800, Damdale, P.R.O.?)

PG 1 note

Nov 9th 17: starting to frost

time

Ball: the 0-2 winter: little or no change!

action

Thompson could be having first frost. (?)

start frost

	
2-2 days	
0	
Sept 1 1914 in the	
Sept 7 City in Ga. River	
Sept 11 City in Ga.	Stealthy
do	11 May Tokyo

8.19 86-101

Ex. C1C

Col. Fred Parker (CIAE) (from AFIC)

(Retired)

Col. George Patten (Army, USAF, Army, France)

Col. George Patten (AF Col. Retired 1966)

(An attaché in Nigeria, then France)

(Art. Inf. Regt. after Germany).

Col. George Kegan

John P. Patten in DENNIA

XNIT

Dear friends at ICA (from C1 & 1966)

1/16/66

File 19 (X1) Parker (Curator of CIA in 1966)

SOY SIDE

A. What was SOY ANTE when George left?

What evidence, if any, of ANTE?

B. What got him out of jail, without further legalizing?

C. What did he have, during 1960-68 days? (With no ANTE?)

From his statement, nothing about the ANTE Ants

1. ANTENDE when he ANTE to ANTE, and did not?

2. ANTENDE ANTE to ANTE?

D. What was R's probable condition & ANTE ANTE ; ANTE

E. What did R probably know from ANTE?

